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Abstract • This article investigates the development of new teaching ideologies 
in the context of the technocratic ideology of the Cold War. These ideologies did 
not simply vanish after 1989. The catchwords were “programmed instruction” and 
“teaching machines”, accompanied by the promise that all students would make 
effi  cient learning progress. Although Eastern and Western states fought the Cold 
War over political ideologies, their teaching ideologies (perhaps surprisingly) con-
verged. This may explain why neither the apparent failure of these educational 
ideologies nor the end of the Cold War led to the modifi cation of the ideologies 
themselves, but rather to the modifi cation of devices serving the ideologies.
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Walter Heller, the economic advisor to the president of the United States, said in his keynote address to the plenary session of the fi rst 
conference about education held by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in October 1961 that educational 
issues were of the utmost importance and therefore should not be left 
entirely to the professional stakeholders in the educational fi eld. “May I 
say that, in this context, the fi ght for education is too important to be left 
solely to the educators.”1 
The notion of fi ghting for education expressed in this speech is not 
misleading. It refers to the fi rst national law on education that the US 
Congress ever passed, that is, the National Defense Education Act of 
1958, which was implemented in direct response to the Sputnik satellite 
launched by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957. The alleged technologi-
cal lead that the Soviets had won over the United States had triggered a 
fundamental national crisis that would prove to have far-reaching con-
sequences for education and daily life. For the fi rst time in US history, 
education became a national issue after having previously been a local 
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issue. This transcendence expresses a more widespread understanding of 
problems as the result of defi cits in the education system. This reaction 
originated in the late eighteenth century and was usually related to social 
problems.2 During the Cold War, however, it was used to address the lack 
of technological competence, which was alleged to have a considerable 
impact on economic and military development. Whereas the process of 
“educationalization” around 1800 was based on questions regarding civic 
progress and uncertainty,3 during the Cold War it fostered school subjects 
such as mathematics and the sciences in the global martial contest for 
world domination. The medical historian Thomas Bonner found wide-
spread support when he wrote, in 1958, that, “Science and education 
have now become the main battleground of the Cold War. It is upon edu-
cation that the fate of our way of life depends. It means that the outcome 
of a third world war may be decided in the classroom.”4 
This educationalization of the Cold War was of course by no means 
limited to the Western world. In the Soviet Union in 1958 the president, 
Nikita Khrushchev, launched an educational reform in secondary educa-
tion in order to “revive technical and vocational emphasis.”5 Although 
the importance of the state’s educational ambitions for the armed forces 
was rarely explicit, such ambitions were frequently expressed in military 
language. It is no coincidence that in the United States one of the leaders 
of this educationalization of the Cold War was Hyman Rickover, a vice 
admiral of the United States Navy and “father of the Nuclear Navy,”6 who 
took an interest in education during the Cold War. “Education is Our First 
Line of Defense—Make it Strong” was the title of the fi rst chapter of Rick-
over’s book Education and Freedom, published in 1959 eighteen months 
after the launching of Sputnik.7 
Rickover’s commitment to educational questions at the end of the 
1950s was not an exception within educational history but part of a 
broader cultural shift that had begun8 in the early 1950s and later began to 
dominate global policy in education via transnational organizations such 
as the OECD. It included an alliance between economists, high-ranking 
military offi cers, scientists, and psychologists including, initially, behav-
ioral psychologists and, later, cognitive psychologists (who were often 
considered to be the heirs of behavioral psychologists). Philip Coombs, 
who also gave a keynote speech alongside Walter Heller at the OECD 
conference on education in October 1961, was an economist who became 
the head of the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning 
in 1963. Coombs held the position until 1968, when he published his 
best-selling The World Educational Crisis.9 The head of the OECD commit-
tee who addressed questions concerning education at that time was Al-
exander King, a British chemist who was assisted by James Ronald Gass, 
a British social scientist who, according to the Norwegian economist and 
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deputy undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Education and Church 
Affairs Kjell Eide, did “not know much about education.”10
The aim of this article is to show that, during the Cold War in the 
1950s, a fundamental educational shift affected the curricula of the coun-
tries involved, and that specifi c organizations (primarily the OEEC and its 
successor OECD, but also the UNESCO International Institute for Educa-
tional Planning) provided the organizational framework for this educa-
tionalized ideology—an ideology which continues to exert its infl uence 
on nation-states to this day. The different strategies connected with this 
educationalization of the Cold War were partially compatible, but not 
mutually coordinated. They were strongly infl uenced by specifi c modes 
of successful problem-solving strategies developed during the Second 
World War in institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Harvard University, and the Manhattan Project. In these settings it 
was not only politicians, scientists, and engineers who were involved in 
cooperative teamwork, but also psychologists, who developed methods 
of testing individual abilities, strategies in applied social psychology, and 
programs of instruction and training. The two stars in educational reforms 
since the late 1950s, Torsten Husén in Europe and Jerome Bruner in the 
United States, had both been military psychologists during the Second 
World War. By virtue of their participation in these war programs these 
psychologists were able to understand problems in the language of sci-
ence, which defi nes relations in a causal way and uses notions such as 
input, output, and rational control system.11 When, in the late 1950s, 
these former military psychologists were requested to help to reform edu-
cation, they translated the complex and non-causal cultural system of 
education into a technological system that could be “steered”.12 Against 
this background, it is not surprising that Bruner, at an education confer-
ence sponsored by the US Air Force in Woods Hole, Massachusetts (after 
Sputnik, in 1959), noted that by reforming education “the entire array 
of possible alternatives that might be created by using existing or newly 
developed technologies … from scratch” and that “the goals of education 
… expressed in terms of the human functions and tasks to be performed 
… can be as exactly and objectively specifi ed as can the human functions 
and tasks in the Atlas Weapon System.”13 
This (largely Western) technocratic culture (of which this article deals 
exclusively with the last) includes the following aspects:
1.  At the level of governance this new strategy challenged the demo-
cratic idea of local school boards. Locally elected laymen were now 
meant to implement the theories of central experts. The general 
assumption of the expert-driven democracy was “that democracy 
is best, in which people participate least.”14 
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2.  These experts based their educational vision on the human capital 
theory (the expansion of education as investment15) and the vision 
of useful knowledge, including languages, sciences, and mathe-
matics (curricular reform).16 
3.  The experts based their education policy decisions on the results of 
cognitive psychology tests in schools and comparative statistics.17 
4.  It was thought that this new ideology would spread across the 
world via transnational organizations such as UNESCO or the 
OECD and national institutions such as the Max Planck Institute 
for Human Development and Education (founded in 1963).18 
5.  Teaching of school subjects should become effi cient and individ-
ual; the catchword was “programmed instruction”, and its central 
instrument was the teaching machine.
The following exploration refl ects the development of new teaching 
ideologies in the context of the overall technocratic ideology of the Cold 
War, ideologies that persisted after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989.19 
This article explores the way in which the new teaching ideology had 
become possible in the context of the Cold War, and how it found expres-
sion in teaching machines and in programmed instruction (often in com-
bination with cybernetics). The third part will show how (after Sputnik 
and the educationalization of the Cold War) these new teaching methods 
were supported and how this support affected unprecedented research 
activities. The fi nal section shows how the failure of this ideology did not 
lead to an intelligent modifi cation of the ideology but to the modifi cation 
of the devices serving the ideology.
The New Science of Learning, Military Anxiety, and Education in the 1950s
When the Cold War was educationalized after the shock of Sputnik in 
1957, a limited amount of relevant and suitable (new) theories of learn-
ing and education were available. In 1953, when McCarthyism was at its 
peak, the behaviorist and former military psychologist B. Skinner pub-
lished his landmark book, Science and Human Behavior.20 During the Sec-
ond World War Skinner had trained pigeons for use in steering Pelican 
missiles, and in his book he transferred his insights into pigeon training 
(“operant conditioning”) to the human sphere. A year later his article 
“The Science of Learning and the Art of Teaching”21 transferred learning 
theory developed with the pigeons (“Science of Learning”) to education 
(“Art of Teaching”).
Learning is understood as behavior, and desired behavior is caused 
by the “reinforcement” of provoked “effects” of specifi c, prepared condi-
tions.22 The advantage of this “positive reinforcement” technique is that 
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(for the fi rst time, Skinner argues) it builds on positive feedback and not 
on aversive feedback. Whereas the old pedagogy had been based on the 
child’s fear of being punished by the rod, the movement called “progres-
sive education” had only seemingly moderated this brutal practice, for 
“anyone who visits the lower grades of the average school today will ob-
serve that a change has been made, not from aversive to positive control, 
but from one form of aversive stimulation to another.”23 In the old sys-
tem, whether traditional or progressive, the teacher cannot escape mis-
treating the learner: 
The child at his desk, fi lling in his work book, is behaving primarily to 
escape from the threat of a series of minor aversive events: the teacher’s 
displeasure, the criticism or ridicule of his classmates, an ignominious 
showing in a competition, low marks, a trip to the offi ce “to be talked 
to” by the principal, or a word to the parent who may still resort to the 
birch rod.24
Wrong reinforcement is one of the problems of the “old” system(s), 
of which Skinner lists another three. First he addresses the time span be-
tween fulfi llment of the task by the learner and the reinforcement by an-
other. “Many seconds or minutes intervene between the child’s response 
and the teacher’s reinforcement … it is surprising that this system has any 
effect whatsoever.”25 Immediate reinforcement is one of the necessities, 
a “skillful program which moves forward through a series of progressive 
approximations to the fi nal complex behavior desired” is another,26 and 
the “frequency of reinforcement” is the third. The result is that “The con-
dition in the average school is a matter of widespread national concern. 
Modern children simply do not learn arithmetic quickly or well.”27 Instead 
of being dedicated to clearly defi ned progressions of learning targets, the 
modern teacher is caught up in unclear expectations brought about by 
progressive philosophy, according to which, “Skills are minimized in favor 
of vague achievements, educating for democracy, educating the whole 
child, educating for life, and so on.”28 When Skinner published his propa-
ganda article about more effective ways of teaching in 1954, John Dewey 
had been dead for two years. Dewey was the epitome of progressive edu-
cation,29 and was accused of having introduced an ineffi cient and possibly 
misguided way of teaching in the United States. 
In the view of the new, science-based paradigm in education, Ameri-
can teachers had been seduced by the false ideals of progressive education 
instead of becoming committed to a modern technological worldview. 
Indeed, the ideals of education advocated by the American teachers as 
they had been formulated in 1961 by the National Education Associa-
tion and the American Association of School Administrators were health, 
worthy home membership, vocational competence, effective citizenship, 
worthy use of leisure, ethical character, self-realization, human relation-
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ships, economic effi ciency and civic responsibility. However, they did not 
include the mastery of school subjects.30 
After Sputnik, these ideals were condemned as inappropriate or even 
dangerous, and they were interpreted as educational practices that weak-
ened the strength of the nation and thus paved the way for the dominance 
of Soviet communism. After Sputnik, in December 1957, Time magazine 
reported on education in the United States. In the article, Vice Admiral 
Hyman Rickover was asked about the effi ciency and purposefulness of the 
American school system. Angrily he said that “If the local school continued 
to teach such pleasant subjects as ‘Life adjustment’ and ‘How to know when 
you are really in love,’ instead of French and physics, its diploma would be, 
for all the world to see, inferior.”31 It is in this context that Rickover postu-
lated, for the fi rst time, national standards and a system of incentives: 
In some fashion we must devise a way to introduce uniform standards 
into American education. It would be best to set up a private agency, a 
Council of Scholars, fi nanced by our colleges and universities as a joint 
undertaking—or perhaps by Foundations. This council would set a na-
tional standard for the high school diploma, as well as for the scholastic 
competence of teachers. High schools accepting this standard would re-
ceive offi cial accreditation, somewhat on the order of the accreditation 
given medical schools and hospitals.32 
Stakeholders at the intersection of the sciences, the military, and the 
economy asked for fundamental change, involving more sciences in the 
curriculum and more science-based modes of teaching. The former presi-
dent of the United States Herbert Hoover declared after Sputnik that 
The trouble is that we are turning out annually from our institutions of 
higher education perhaps fewer than half as many scientists and engi-
neers as we did seven years ago. The greatest enemies of all mankind, the 
Communists, are turning out twice or possibly three times as many as 
we do. Our higher institutions of learning have the capacity to train the 
recruits we need. The harsh fact is that the high schools are not prepar-
ing youngsters for the entrance requirements which must be maintained 
by our institutions training scientists and engineers.33
Skinner did not wait long, and published an article as early as 1958 
in which he propagated his ideas of teaching machines, defi ning his ideas 
on operant conditioning. 
Teaching Machines and Programmed Learning
Skinner started advocating his teaching machines in 1954, the same year 
that he transferred his insights from pigeon training to education. He pro-
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duced a fi lm in which he demonstrated the effects of his new teaching 
method.34 In the fi lm, he praises the teaching machine as “a device which 
creates vastly improved conditions for effective studying.”35 The machine 
looks like this:
In the fi lm, Skinner goes on to explain the function of the teaching ma-
chine with the same rationale developed in his article, “The Science of 
Learning and the Art of Teaching”: “With the machine you have just seen 
in use, the student sees a bit of text, or rather printed material, in a win-
dow.” This bit could be a “sentence or two, or an equation in arithmetic.” 
However, this bit is not complete; some “small part is missing, and the 
student must supply it by writing on an exposed strip of paper.” Accord-
ing to the created problem the student’s response “may be an answer to 
a question or the solution of a problem, but generally it is simply a sym-
bol or word, which completes the material he has just read.” The great 
advantage of this kind of learning, says Skinner, is that as “soon as the 
student has written his response, he operates the machine and learns im-
mediately whether he is right or wrong. This is a great improvement over 
the system in which papers are corrected by a teacher, where the student 
must wait perhaps till another day to learn whether or not what he has 
written is right.”36
Skinner37 sees three fundamental advantages to the machine: imme-
diacy, individuality, and perfectibility:
Figure 1. Skinner teaching machine.
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1.  Immediacy: Immediate feedback has two effects: (1) “It leads most 
rapidly to the formation of correct behavior. The student quickly 
learns to be right” and (2) “The student is free of uncertainty or 
anxiety about his success or failure.” Skinner says this makes 
“work … pleasurable.” Coercion is no longer needed, for a “class-
room in which machines are being used is usually the scene of 
intense concentration.”
2.  Individuality: The machine allows the student “to move at his own 
pace.” Therefore, it solves the problem of traditional teaching “in 
which a whole class is forced to move forward together, the bright 
student wastes time waiting for others to catch up, and the slow 
student, who may not be inferior in any other respect, is forced to 
go too fast.”
3.  Perfectibility: A third feature of this propagated machine teaching is 
that “each student follows a carefully constructed program.” This 
program leads “from the initial stage, where he is wholly unfamil-
iar with the subject, to a fi nal stage in which he is competent.” The 
student progresses “by taking a large number of very small steps, 
arranged in a coherent order. Each step is so small that he is almost 
certain to take it correctly.” 
The presence of small steps increases the chance of success, and suc-
cess in turn motivates the student to continue (“positive reinforcement”). 
Skinner promises that this setting is not only better in terms of motivation 
but also in terms of effi ciency. “A conservative estimate seems to be that 
with these machines, the average grade or high school student can cover 
about twice as much material with the same amount of time and effort as 
with traditional classroom techniques.”38
In 1958, in the wake of Sputnik, the National Defense Education Act 
had set aside seventy million dollars annually for subsequent years “for 
the acquisition of teaching equipment (suitable for use in providing educa-
tion in science, mathematics, or modern foreign languages),”39 and Skin-
ner was supported in the further development of this teaching machine. 
To legitimate his teaching ideology, Skinner published an article about 
teaching machines in the journal Science in October 1958.40 Not surpris-
ingly, the article starts with a comment on the need for more education 
and for more effective education. “There are more people in the world 
than ever before, and a far greater part of them want an education. The 
demand cannot be met simply by building more schools and training more 
teachers. Education must become more effi cient.”41 The growing size of 
the classes, says Skinner, may render the student “more and more a mere 
passive receiver of instruction.”42 Skinner mentions earlier attempts to 
design teaching machines by Sidney Pressey, a psychology professor at 
Ohio State University, but reminds us that in those days learning theories 
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had not been well developed. This had changed in the meantime, Skinner 
argues. “The learning process is now much better understood. Much of 
what we know has come from studying the behavior of lower organisms, 
but the results hold surprisingly well for human subjects.”43 However, 
what works with regard to “the behavior of lower organisms often cannot 
be arranged by hand; rather elaborate apparatus is needed. The human 
organism requires even more subtle instrumentation.”44 
In the article Skinner repeats his main argument from his text of 
1953, criticizing the “old” way of teaching, criticizing John Dewey for 
not having had a real alternative to the old drill school, and propagating 
his teaching machine for effective learning (a “science of behavior”45) in 
mathematics, foreign languages, and high school physics. Here, Skinner 
admits that the “machine itself, of course, does not teach.” However, it 
“brings the student into contact with the person who composed the ma-
terial it presents. It is a labor-saving device because it can bring one pro-
grammer into contact with an indefi nite number of students. This may 
suggest mass production, but the effect upon each student is surprisingly 
like that of a private tutor.”46 The reference person for the student is no 
longer the teacher but the programmer. It is of no surprise that stakehold-
ers in the late 1950s supported efforts to develop the teaching machine, 
for it complemented another idea on instructing with minimum emphasis 
on teachers, again developed by the intersection of army and psychology, 
namely, the idea of “programmed learning” developed by the air force 
around 1955.
Programmed Learning and the Anxieties of the Cold War 
In 1955, a year after Skinner had launched the idea of a teaching machine 
that promised to instruct students more effi ciently than the old ways of 
teaching, two psychologists (Guy Besnard and Leslie Briggs), an air force 
lieutenant (George Mursch), and a member of the technical staff at Hughes 
Aircraft (Elbert Walker) published a brochure entitled Development of the 
Subject-Matter Trainer,47 in which the idea of programmed instruction was 
explained for the fi rst time. According to the authors, an ideal “device” 
should “provide opportunity for effective individual and group study of 
the adjustment and check procedures to be learned.”48 In accordance with 
Skinner’s ideas, students should “receive automatic guidance and infor-
mation as to the correctness or incorrectness of each response made” and 
that this would “[free] the instructor to work with students performing on 
the equipment.” If the device was “versatile enough” to offer the students 
“practice in a great variety of learning problems,” it should be capable of 
being used “regardless of the student’s previous degree of knowledge of 
the problem at hand.”49 
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A couple of months later, Besnard, Briggs, and Walker published an-
other twelve-page brochure, The Improved Subject-Matter Trainer.50 Here 
again, the idea of programmed instruction was favored, and the “device” 
was developed “to permit students to practice and learn technical sub-
ject matter under conditions of reinforced practice with minimum aid 
of the instructor.” Six modes of operation had been designed, fi ve learn-
ing modes and one test mode, through which the student could learn 
effectively.51 
Between 1955 and 1957 the notion of “programmed learning” was 
used mostly in air force contexts or in training for medical assistants. How-
ever, after Sputnik (in October 1957) the idea became a global one. The 
Instructional Service of the National Education Association, contracted to 
the US Department of Education to promote the National Defense Educa-
tion Act, and organized propaganda initiatives in which people like Wil-
bur Lang Schramm, a professor of English who had served in the Second 
World War in the Offi ce of War Information (where he became familiar 
with behaviorism), served as propagandists. 
In 1962 Schramm published a seventy-four-page booklet called Pro-
grammed Instruction: Today and Tomorrow.52 The publisher was the Fund 
for the Advancement of Education, an initiative of the Ford Foundation, 
which in 1968 became the co-sponsor of the Center of Educational Re-
search and Innovation (CERI) at the OECD and later nurtured PISA. The 
purpose of the booklet was to popularize Skinner’s idea of programmed 
instruction. In his half-page introduction, Schramm promised what every 
reformer in education had always promised, that is, to break with tradi-
tion and begin completely anew. “Programmed instruction” was of “rev-
olutionary signifi cance” for the education system, for it served to free 
schools and every individual learner from the “bonds of the past.”53 The 
fi rst chapter outlined the general idea. “Programmed instruction” replaces 
the teacher’s role from the student’s point of view and induces the learner 
to specifi c desired ways of behavior. Programmed instruction can be exe-
cuted by textbooks, but also by teaching machines. Schramm emphasized 
that the program consists of a series of statements where the student has 
to fi ll in a gap in the text or answer a question or tick a multiple-choice 
option. The pupil should immediately receive a response to his behav-
ior. To give pupils a sense of success, the program should be formulated 
such that each learning step is so small that the learner selects the right 
answers most of the time.54 The large number of publications addressing 
the subject demonstrates the success of this propaganda in the nervous 
culture of the Cold War. In English-language publications, the notion of 
“programmed instruction” was used in twenty-three different articles or 
chapters in 1957 and in 379 different articles or chapters in 1962.55 
After 1958, the two ideas of the teaching machine and programmed 
learning were often mentioned together and not infrequently combined 
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with cybernetics. In Germany, for instance, where the fi rst evidence of 
discussions about American language laboratories and teaching machines 
appeared in 196056 and 1961,57 a symposium was held in 1963 in Nürtin-
gen about Lehrmaschinen in kybernetischer und pädagogischer Sicht (Teaching 
Machines from a Cybernetic and Educational Point of View).58 The same 
year, an international conference took place in Berlin called Programmed 
Instruction and Teaching Machines, which included a panel on “cybernetics 
in relation to programmed instruction” organized by the editor of the 
Nürtingen symposium.59 In 1964, the Lexicon of Programmed Instruction 
(Wörterbuch Programmierter Unterricht) was published with the subtitle 
Short Terminology List of Cybernetic Education (Kleine Terminologie der kyber-
netischen Pädagogik).60
Not least due to specifi c translations, such as Schramm’s Programmed 
Instruction: Today and Tomorrow or Robert Mager’s Preparing Objectives for 
Programmed Instruction (Lernziele und Programmierter Unterricht), the idea of 
teaching machines and programmed instruction became popular in Eu-
rope. In Germany the number of publications with either programmed 
instruction or teaching machine in the title rose from six in 1960 to over 
170 in 1963. 
The “enemies” behind the Iron Curtain pursued similar explorations. 
They too started to investigate programmed instruction and teaching ma-
chines, as Hartmut Vogt reported in 1965 in a booklet entitled Programmed 
Instruction and Teaching Machines in Academies and Professional Schools in the 
Soviet Union (Programmierter Unterricht und Lehrmaschinen an Hoch- und 
Fachschulen der Sowjetunion).61 As early as 1962, the journal Questions of 
Psychology (Вопросы психологии) reported on the Implementation of Some Psy-
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chological Principles in Teaching Machines in the USA (Реализация некоторых 
психологических принципов в обучающих машинах в США).62 Programmed 
instruction, based in part on fi ndings from animal psychology, was not af-
fected by the deep political and ideological differences between the West 
and the East; both sides found it relevant. Moreover, it served the inter-
ests of two political leaders who were striving toward global dominance, 
as the illustrations for publications in the Soviet Union shows:
Autumn 2013 13
The Technocratic Momentum after 1945, the Development of Teaching Machines, and Sobering Results
The Unteachable Reformers
After 1960 several teaching machines and even more textbooks were pro-
duced, based on programmed instruction. At the same time language lab-
oratories became popular. Schools invested a lot of money in laboratories 
to make learning easier than before. Extremely complex efforts were un-
dertaken to “program” knowledge in an infallible way. The idea that both 
the human mind and the facts of the subject matter were prearranged in 
an analog way had already been advanced by some eighteenth-century 
philosophers and reinforced at the Woods Hole conference in 1959, with 
the support of the air force, the RAND cooperation, and the National 
Academy of Sciences, under the leadership of Jerome Bruner. The general 
psychological idea underlying the reform was that “intellectual activity” 
(the cognitive process) is uniform in principle, regardless of a person’s 
age or situation. The conviction was that “intellectual activity anywhere 
is the same, whether at the frontier of knowledge or in a third grade 
classroom.”63 However, not only the human intellect, but also academic 
and school disciplines were uniform. To learn a discipline at school, the 
participants at the Woods Hole conference claimed, was basically to learn 
its “structure”. This learning of structure was claimed to be the “heart of 
the educational process,”64 which meant that every discipline had a gen-
eral “idea” or “basic or underlying principle” that needed to be learned 
by the student. The experts should make decisions concerning curricular 
content. “The decision as to what should be taught … is a decision that 
can best be reached with the aid of those with a high degree of vision and 
competence”65 in the academic disciplines and was not a decision to be 
made by elected school boards. 
However, the challenges encountered when constructing ideal pro-
grams that served the individual’s capacities were severe and, after ten 
years, led to disillusionment. Textbooks dispensed with the idea of gap 
texts to be fi lled in from the late 1970s. Those teaching machines that 
were developed (and sold), such as Brigg’s Subject Matter Trainer, PLATO, 
Socrates, CLASS-System, Promentaboy, MIN/MAX III, Unitutor, Mitsi 
2023, Geromat or Robbimat,66 have disappeared and are largely unknown 
to modern historians of education, and language laboratories have been 
removed from schools and colleges.
However, out of sight is not out of mind. The general idea that educa-
tion is a technological system that should be steered like a technical sys-
tem has not disappeared. When the discussions about more effi ciency in 
schooling started to label traditional policy as “input-steering” and to com-
pare it with the allegedly more effi cient “output-” or “outcome-steering”, 
this technocratic thinking gave rise to a dichotomy. Experts (the former 
programmers) defi ne standards in subject matter, while schools are “free” 
(autonomous) in their choice of methods to achieve these standards. To 
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ensure compliance from the schools, incentives serve as motivation in 
the same way that Skinner used bread with his hungry pigeons, reward-
ing them after they had been trained to play a sort of table tennis, as he 
proudly recounted in 1954.67 
The shift in educational policy from “input” to “output” was possible 
with the shift from behaviorism to cognitive psychology. Whereas behav-
iorism aimed to create desired behavior as defi ned by experts, cognitive 
psychology measures desired competencies as defi ned by experts. Both 
systems try to minimize the role of teachers in both their public role and 
in their daily interaction, and both systems view the democratic process 
as one that is potentially opposed to so-called experts. Both systems view 
the teacher as a coach, who implements defaults defi ned by experts. It is 
no coincidence that, in 1963, when programmed instruction and teaching 
machines were attracting the attention of education policymakers, the sec-
retary of the Committee for Scientifi c and Technical Personnel, Alexander 
King, was lambasting criticism by national delegates who accused him of 
integrating so-called experts without asking the members. King told them 
they were simply not familiar enough with the issues to evaluate the com-
mittee’s work.68 Chester Finn, a tireless promoter of standards in American 
schools, described the local school boards in the United States as “living 
fossils of an earlier age.”69 Those in power did not adequately consider the 
right to the Western ideals of participation and self-determination.
It is part of this cultural heritage that those who fail do not question 
either the aspiration or the approach, but rather the technology. How else 
could we understand the current initiative of Idaho’s superintendent Tom 
Luna70 who, on the basis of the alleged bad PISA results (output steer-
ing), wants to improve school outcomes by using computer-based online 
learning programs (input steering) and to cover the investment by reduc-
ing teachers’ salaries?71 William Pinar reports that a 2011 Idaho state leg-
islature initiative passed a law “requiring all high school students to take 
online classes in order to graduate.”72 Similar to an initiative in North Car-
olina, “the state promised to provide all students and their teachers [with] 
laptops or tablets.” However, “to pay for these purchases, the state shifted 
tens of millions of dollars away from teacher salaries. State bureaucrats 
also announced a shift in the role of teachers, who, they announced, 
would no longer be ‘lecturers,’ standing at the front of classrooms.” Here 
the idea of the teacher as “coach” or “guide” came up again. “Teachers 
would be ‘guides,’ their teaching focused only on helping students com-
plete whatever lessons appeared on those computer screens (Richtel 4 
January 2012, A1, B4).”73 
The army-run laboratories during the Second World War had de-
veloped an effi cient way of solving problems. These problems were not 
social, concerning questions of equity, justice, or freedom, but military, 
concerning weapons, survival, and killing. This method of problem solv-
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ing was designed to be adapted to the postwar period. In 1944, President 
Roosevelt asked Vannevar Bush, a trained engineer and initiator of the 
Manhattan Project, to prepare a report on the question “What can be 
done, consistent with military security, and with the prior approval of the 
military authorities, to make known to the world as soon as possible the 
contributions which have been made during our war effort to scientifi c 
knowledge?”74 Bush’s report, entitled Science: The Endless Frontier, delivered 
on 25 July 1945 to President Harry Truman, closely recounted the future 
fi ght against disease, defense against aggressors, and the establishment of 
a welfare state to promote “new knowledge” that “can be obtained only 
through basic scientifi c research.”75 Scientifi c work involved teamwork 
by experts, as practiced during the Second World War: “Science can be 
effective in the national welfare only as a member of a team, whether the 
conditions be peace or war. But without scientifi c progress no amount of 
achievement in other directions can insure our health, prosperity, and 
security as a nation in the modern world.”76 Science education as a pro-
gram designed to ensure the “renewal of our scientifi c talent”77 was of the 
highest importance for the future. The history of education over the last 
sixty years is a testament to the success of this commitment.
This technocratic and technological educational culture was acti-
vated after Sputnik and implemented as a strategy toward global salva-
tion against the new enemy, the Soviet Union. The problem was that the 
Soviet Union had a similar agenda, and claimed to be on the path toward 
freedom, welfare, and justice. Both ideologies and systems relied on re-
forming education on the basis of principles of central expertise, techno-
logical innovation, and supporting psychology. Against this background it 
is not surprising that the differences between Western and Eastern edu-
cational reforms during the Cold War were much smaller than the overall 
ideological differences would suggest. The technocratic movement, which 
gained momentum in the laboratories of the Second World War, had no 
frontier, and still exerts an infl uence. A broader historical investigation 
into this transnational discourse of salvation and its materialization in 
teaching media and devices has still to be carried out. 
 * A fi rst version of this article was presented in the special working group 
“Educational media in comparative perspective” on occasion of the annual 
ISCHE meeting at the University of Geneva, 27–30 June 2012 (28 June). I 
thank Eckhardt Fuchs for inviting me to this group.
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